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THE FIGHT OVER ENCRYPTION: REASONS WHY 
CONGRESS MUST BLOCK THE GOVERNMENT 
FROM COMPELLING TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
TO CREATE BACKDOORS INTO THEIR DEVICES
SHANNON LEAR*
ABSTRACT
Advances in technology in the past decade have blurred the line between 
individuals’ privacy rights and the government’s ability to access information. How 
should this issue be handled in a manner that balances the privacy rights of individuals 
and the government’s access to information in the interest of national security?
This Note proposes a bright-line rule that would continue to allow the government 
to obtain specific information from a data service provider without forcing the 
company to circumvent its own security features. Under this rule, a company shall 
relinquish specific information in its control or possession only by court order and 
only when necessary to aid the government in the interest of national security. Such 
information would not include security software, but instead only account 
information, which the company can readily access. Further, no court shall order a 
data service provider to create or modify programming that would bypass security 
features as a means to access protected information. Such programming would provide 
hackers and governmental entities with a backdoor into other similar devices. Indeed, 
once created and surrendered, this programming is at risk of being hacked or used by 
the government in other circumstances. The suggested legislation would not bar a 
technology company from voluntarily assisting the government or law enforcement in 
gaining access to encrypted data by creating or modifying programming. If a company 
chooses to do so, the company could assist and would receive reasonable 
compensation for the costs incurred.
The legal battles between Apple and the FBI demonstrate that without a bright-
line rule, the government will continue to attempt to gain access to as much 
information as it can through legislation such as the All Writs Act. Further, forcing a 
technology company to create or modify programming violates constitutional rights. 
The costs associated with creating a backdoor far exceed the benefits. Therefore, until 
Congress speaks to this issue, the legal battle will continue, as the line between privacy 
rights and the government’s access to information remains blurred.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over one billion Apple devices are active worldwide.1 In the United States, 95% 
of individuals own a cellphone, and 77% own a smartphone.2 Additionally, 
approximately 80% of adults own a computer, and 50% own a tablet.3 These statistics 
suggest that an overwhelming amount of the population stores personal information 
on the Internet.4 But, what degree of protection exists for such personal information? 
Is it safe to store our information online? Of course, technology companies worldwide 
have installed security features on their devices to protect their customers’ personal 
information.5 These security systems encrypt data, “turn[ing] your data into 
indecipherable text that can be read only by those with the right key.”6 However, not 
all information can be protected; some electronic data can be accessed remotely 
through surveillance techniques.7 Further, electronic data companies surrender 
information to the government or law enforcement agencies upon service of a court 
order or presentation of a search warrant.8
In 2013, reporters published secret, government documents that revealed 
surveillance of phone and Internet communications.9 Throughout these operations, the 
government collected data from millions of Internet users and telephone subscribers.10
Since these leaks, a majority of Americans have attempted to secure their personal 
                                                          
1 Nick Statt, 1 Billion Apple Devices Are in Active Use Around the World, VERGE (Jan. 26, 
2016), http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/26/10835748/apple-devices-active-1-billion-iphone-
ipad-ios.
2 Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017) [hereinafter PEW RES. CTR.],
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/. Oxford Dictionary defines smartphone as “[a] 
mobile phone that performs many of the functions of a computer, typically having a touchscreen 
interface, Internet access, and an operating system capable of running downloaded apps.” 
Smartphone, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/smartphone 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
3 PEW RES. CTR., supra note 2.
4 Personal information that is often stored on devices includes conversations, photographs, 
music, contact information, calendar events, financial information, and health information. A
Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/.
5 Patrick Gray, Tech Companies and Government May Soon Go to War over Surveillance,
WIRED (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/08/stop-clumping-tech-companies-in-
with-government-in-the-surveillance-scandals-they-may-be-at-war/.
6 Our Approach to Privacy, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-privacy/ 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
7 See Eric Lichtblau & Katie Benner, Apple Fights Order to Unlock San Bernardino 
Gunman’s iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/technology/apple-timothy-cook-fbi-san-bernardino.html.
8 Id.
9 Paul Szoldra, This Is Everything Edward Snowden Revealed in One Year of 
Unprecedented Top-Secret Leaks, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 16, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/snowden-leaks-timeline-2016-9.
10 Id.
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information, believing that the government’s surveillance of communications was 
“unacceptable.”11
Recently, the government has sought to broaden privacy laws in technology and 
government access to data.12 One example of this is the legal battle between the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and Apple, Inc. (“Apple”).13 Following a 
shooting in San Bernardino, California, the FBI obtained the iPhone of San Bernardino 
shooter Rizwan Farook, but the FBI was unable to access certain information stored 
on the device.14 The FBI requested a court order demanding that Apple create a 
backdoor to its security features so the government could access the secure 
information contained on Farook’s iPhone.15 A magistrate judge for the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California ordered Apple to assist the FBI in 
hacking into the iPhone.16 Apple fought the court order and refused to create a 
backdoor.17 Shortly thereafter, the FBI dropped its case against Apple after an 
anonymous third party helped the FBI gain access to the iPhone.18
Another recent legal battle between the FBI and Apple involved a locked device 
belonging to Jun Feng, a drug offender.19 The FBI sought a court order to compel 
Apple to assist the FBI in hacking into the locked device.20 Although Feng pleaded 
guilty to the charges against him, the FBI and Apple requested that the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York still address the issue of whether 
                                                          
11 Arik Hesseldahl, Snowden Leaks Have Changed How Americans See Their Privacy,
RECODE (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.recode.net/2015/3/16/11560290/snowden-leaks-have-
changed-how-americans-see-their-privacy.
12 See Lichtblau & Benner, supra note 7.
13 Elizabeth Weise, Apple v FBI Timeline: 43 Days that Rocked Tech, USA TODAY (Mar. 
30, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/03/15/apple-v-fbi-
timeline/81827400/.
14 Id.
15 Memorandum of Points & Authorities at 1, United States v. Black Lexus IS300 
California License Plate 5KGD203, handicap placard 360466F, Vehicle Identification No. 
JTHBD192X50094434, No. 15–0451M 2016 WL 680288, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).
16 Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search at 1, In re the Search of an 
Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, 
California License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15–0451M 2016 WL 618401, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Order Compelling Apple to Assist].
17 A Message to Our Customers, supra note 4.
18 Julia Edwards, FBI Paid More than $1.3 Million to Break into San Bernardino iPhone,
REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-fbi-
idUSKCN0XI2IB.
19 Kevin McCoy, Apple Doesn’t Have to Unlock Drug Dealer’s iPhone, Judge Says, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/02/29/judge-denies-fed-
request-force-apple-bypass-iphone-passcode/81125500/.
20 Id.
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the government was able to compel Apple to create software to hack into the device.21
After hearing from Apple and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the magistrate judge 
refused to order Apple to modify its programming to enable the FBI to bypass security 
features on the iPhone.22
Advocates on both sides of this issue are vying for legislation.23 Meanwhile, the 
government is taking these matters to court and seeking a judgment in its favor. If the 
court issues a writ compelling Apple to create or modify programming that would 
disable security features on an iPhone, the government would rely on this precedent 
in future matters.24 This issue posits important questions: (1) to what information does 
(and should) the government legally have access; (2) should the government and law 
enforcement be allowed to compel technology companies to hack into devices to gain 
access to encrypted data; and (3) if so, under what circumstances should this be 
allowed? Recently, Apple has had requests to help gain access to data stored on locked 
iPhones from many other agencies.25 While the discussed battles between Apple and 
the FBI may be over, we will continue to see litigation between the government and 
technology companies over this issue in the future.26 To settle this dispute, Congress 
should enact legislation drawing a line between what the government and law 
enforcement agencies can and cannot compel technology companies to do. More 
specifically, Congress should not allow the government and law enforcement agencies 
to have access to encrypted data, if the only means by which to obtain the data is by 
forcing companies to write or rewrite programming to hack into locked devices.
Section II of this Note will provide the history of the right to privacy and will 
discuss limitations on these privacy rights. Section III will address current problems 
regarding privacy rights and the government’s access to electronic information. It also 
will explore the current laws surrounding this issue, using the recent legal battles 
between the FBI and Apple—the FBI’s attempts to gain access to the iPhone of Syed 
Rizwan Farook, the San Bernardino shooter, and the FBI’s attempts to gain access to 
the locked device belonging to drug dealer Jun Feng—as examples. Section III also 
will address other legal issues facing technology companies when they fail to comply 
with overreaching search warrants.
Section IV will argue that Congress should enact legislation setting out a hard and 
fast rule that would protect encrypted data. Safeguarding encrypted data would 
protect, rather than harm, national security. Legislation preventing the compelled 
                                                          
21 Alison Frankel, How a N.Y. Judge Inspired Apple’s Encryption Fight with Justice,
REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2016/02/17/how-a-n-y-judge-
inspired-apples-encryption-fight-with-justice/.
22 Id.
23 See The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (2016); Katie Benner & Joseph Goldstein, 
Apple Wins Ruling in New York iPhone Hacking Order, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/technology/apple-wins-ruling-in-new-york-iphone-
hacking-order.html.
24 See Answers to Your Questions About Apple and Security, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/answers/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2017).
25 Id.
26 See Arjun Kharpal, Apple vs FBI: All You Need to Know, CNBC (Mar. 29, 2016), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/29/apple-vs-fbi-all-you-need-to-know.html.
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creation of backdoors will prevent the government from becoming too powerful, thus 
keeping Big Brother at bay. Conversely, a law allowing the government to compel the 
creation of backdoors would violate Constitutional rights and would incur more costs 
than benefits.
Finally, Section V will propose a legislative solution. The proposed law would 
prohibit the government and law enforcement agencies from compelling a technology 
company to modify or create programming to bypass security codes on locked devices. 
However, this law would not preclude technology companies from deciding to provide 
technological assistance to aid investigations in which threats to public safety or 
national security exist. In circumstances where a company does provide technological 
assistance, this law would require that the government or law enforcement agency 
provide reasonable compensation to the company in exchange for the services 
rendered. Further, this law would prohibit companies from selling a hack or backdoor. 
These measures are necessary to protect national security, to protect individuals’ 
Constitutional rights by limiting government power, and to promote efficiency, 
predictability, and uniformity in the law.
II. THE HISTORY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS
While not expressly stated in the United States Constitution, the right to privacy is 
implied in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.27 The Fourth Amendment 
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.28
Through case law, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment and 
defined the right to privacy. In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized 
that the Fourth Amendment protects an individual rather than a specific 
constitutionally protected area.29 The Court ruled that electronic surveillance of a 
public phone booth conversation was a search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment because the defendant intended that the telephone conversation be private 
and “sought to exclude . . . the uninvited ear.”30 Though the phone booth was publicly 
accessible, the defendant sought to exclude others from hearing the communication.31
By contrast, the Court held that information that a person does not attempt to secure 
                                                          
27 Tim Sharp, Right to Privacy: Constitutional Rights & Privacy Laws, LIVE SCI. (June 12, 
2013), http://www.livescience.com/37398-right-to-privacy.html.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (overturning Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), which allowed the 
warrantless search and seizure of intangible property).
30 Id. at 352.
31 Id.
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and instead “knowingly exposes to the public” was not protected under the Fourth 
Amendment.32
In 2012, the Supreme Court expanded Katz in United States v. Jones; the Court 
found that global positioning system tracking of a motor vehicle was a “search” within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.33 Two years later, in Riley v. California, the 
Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of cell phone data contained on a device 
seized during an arrest was unconstitutional.34 This case acknowledged an individual’s 
right to privacy in content stored on cell phones and held that law enforcement must 
obtain a warrant to access this private information.35
In addition to case law interpreting privacy rights, Congress has enacted legislation 
that governs the access to, and use of, electronic information.36 For example, the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”) classifies different types 
of information and ascribes a different level of protection to each classification.37
Based on the classification under which information falls, access to such information 
may require a subpoena, court order, or a search warrant.38 Yet, the ECPA protects 
only a subset of virtual communication and affords little protection to workplace 
communications.39
Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“Patriot Act”). The Patriot Act updated the ECPA 
                                                          
32 Id. at 351.
33 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (“The Government physically 
occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such 
a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted.”); id. at 406 (“[W]e must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree 
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” 
(quoting Kyllo v. United States 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001))).
34 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014).
35 Naomi Lachance, At Supreme Court, Debate over Phone Privacy Has a Long History,
NPR (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/02/29/468609371/at-
supreme-court-debate-over-phone-privacy-has-a-long-history.
36 See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–21, 2701–10, 3121–26).
37 Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 
U.S.C.§ 2510–22, JUST. INFO. SHARING, [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ECPA], 
https://it.ojp.gov/privacyliberty/authorities/statutes/1285 (last revised July 30, 2013).
38 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1986); see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ECPA, supra note 37. The ECPA 
criminalizes electronic surveillance of “wire, oral, or electronic communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 
2511 (1986); ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),
EPIC.ORG, https://www.epic.org/privacy/ecpa/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). However, 
exceptions to this rule exist. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2516–17 (1986). For example, an employer 
is allowed to surveil employee communications, so long as the employer included this in 
employee contracts. See ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., supra note 38.
39 Privacy, USLEGAL.COM, https://internetlaw.uslegal.com/privacy/ (last visited Dec. 1, 
2016).
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018
450 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:443
and expanded government access to information.40 The Act extended the range of 
terrorist activities on which the government could gather information through 
surveillance.41 Further, the Patriot Act gave the government broad authority to gather 
information on a specific person without specifying the exact electronic devices to be 
surveilled.42 Yet, despite such legislation and case law on privacy rights in consumer 
electronic data, many gaps still exist in the law. The line between individual rights and 
government rights to encrypted data stored on locked devices remains unclear.
III. THE RAPID ADVANCEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY RAISES NEW CONCERNS 
REGARDING PRIVACY RIGHTS & NATIONAL SECURITY
In 2013, reporters leaked government documents that revealed a high level of 
government surveillance of civilian phone and Internet communications.43 The 
government conducted this surveillance unknowingly to the public; upon learning of 
such government action, many Americans sought to secure their data.44 Yet, in recent 
years, the government has sought to broaden its access to data45—taking Apple, 
Google, and Microsoft to court over access to electronic data.46 Further, government 
and law enforcement requests for electronically stored personal information have 
increased in the past few years.47
A. The Problem
The year 2013 shed light on the issue of privacy in the age of technology. That 
year, former National Security Agency (“NSA”) contractor Edward Snowden leaked 
information on government surveillance.48 “Whistleblower” Snowden leaked this 
information to reporters who subsequently reported it to the public, thereby exposing 
                                                          
40 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA Patriot Act”), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001); see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
JUST. INFO. SHARING, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1281#contentTop 
(last revised July 29, 2013).
41 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: PRESERVING LIFE AND LIBERTY 1,
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/what_is_the_patriot_act.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2018).
42 Id. Congress expanded the government’s surveillance authority “because international 
terrorists are sophisticated and trained to thwart surveillance by rapidly changing locations and 
communication devices such as cell phones . . . .” Id. at 2.
43 Szoldra, supra note 9.
44 See Hesseldahl, supra note 11.
45 See id.
46 Matt Apuzzo et al., Apple and Other Tech Companies Tangle with U.S. over Data Access,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/us/politics/apple-and-other-
tech-companies-tangle-with-us-over-access-to-data.html.
47 Rafia Shaikh, Apple & Google Report Sharp Increase in Government Data Requests,
WCCFTECH (Sept. 29, 2017), https://wccftech.com/google-apple-report-high-data-requests/.
48 Edward Snowden: Leaks that Exposed US Spy Programme, BBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964.
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details of secret government operations.49 One such exposed operation concerned a 
government order granted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) 
that compelled Verizon to turn over all call information in their system on a daily 
basis.50 FISC granted the order under the “business records” provision of the Patriot 
Act.51 This systematic collection of communication records is alarming because the 
communications were “collected indiscriminately and in bulk—regardless of whether 
[the government] suspected . . . any wrongdoing.”52 This collection is also unusual 
because of the all-encompassing nature of the order.53
Typically, a court order for records granted by FISC relates to a specific individual 
or group suspected of terrorist activities.54 Instead, this court order, which excluded 
message content and personal information attached to cell phone numbers, “would 
allow the NSA to build easily a comprehensive picture of who any individual 
contacted, how and when, and possibly from where, retrospectively.”55 United States 
senators have voiced concerns that the government’s “extreme interpretation of the 
law” allows the NSA to “engage in excessive domestic surveillance.”56 Snowden 
described these operations as “the systematic surveillance of innocent citizens.”57 The 
leaks elucidated how easily the government could obtain electronic data and 
communications without the public’s knowledge.
Snowden argued regarding government action:
So long as there’s broad support amongst a people, it can be argued there’s 
a level of legitimacy even to the most invasive and morally wrong program, 
as it was an informed and willing decision. . . . However, programs that are 
implemented in secret, out of public oversight, lack that legitimacy, and 
that’s a problem. It also represents a dangerous normalization of 
                                                          
49 Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA 
Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-
surveillance; see Edward Snowden: Leaks That Exposed US Spy Programme, supra note 48.
50 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers 
Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013) [hereinafter Greenwald, NSA], 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order; 
Angus West, 17 Disturbing Things Snowden Has Taught Us (So Far), PUB. RADIO INT’L (June 
1, 2015), http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-07-09/17-disturbing-things-snowden-has-taught-us-
so-far.
51 Greenwald, NSA, supra note 50 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2017)).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Barton Gellman et al., Edward Snowden Comes Forward as Source of NSA Leaks, WASH.
POST (June 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/intelligence-leaders-push-back-
on-leakers-media/2013/06/09/fff80160-d122-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html.
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“governing in the dark,” where decisions with enormous public impact 
occur without any public input.58
The government is given much leeway when it uses our national intelligence 
agencies to collect information.59 With the rise of technology comes the emergence of 
new threats to our national security. To combat cybercrime, the government collects 
information such as “logs of telephone, Skype, and cell phone calls, tweets, Facebook 
posts, emails, Internet-site visits, GPS coordinates, and so forth.”60 One commentator 
described this extensive collection of information as “the amassing of an enormously 
large haystack, within which intelligence and law enforcement agencies would, under 
current U.S. law, be entitled to search for a very few, legally distinct needles.”61 Since 
the 2013 intelligence leaks, courts have issued fewer and fewer court orders that would 
allow the government access to civilian records through surveillance.62 Despite this 
abatement of pro-government court orders, the issue of privacy remains pervasive and 
will continue to spark debate.63 Most recently, the legal battles between Apple and the 
FBI have individuals talking about privacy concerns.64
B. The Federal Bureau of Investigation Versus Apple
The following two cases provide background information on the growing tension 
between Apple and the FBI. These cases also illustrate the problem of Congressional 
silence on government authority to force companies to assist in gaining access to 
content stored on locked devices.
1. Syed Farook’s iPhone
Early in December of 2015, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik killed 
fourteen people and injured twenty-two others in a shooting in San Bernardino, 
California.65 Farook was born in the United States and married Malik, who was born 
in Pakistan and moved to the United States in 2015.66 The couple spent years plotting 
                                                          
58 George R. Lucas, Jr., NSA Management Directive #424: Secrecy and Privacy in the 
Aftermath of Edward Snowden, 28 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 29, 29 (2014) (quoting James Risen, 
Snowden Says He Took No Secret Files to Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2013, at A1).
59 Cf. id. at 32 (comparing data collection to a haystack).
60 Id. at 31.
61 Id. at 32.
62 Cf. id.
63 See Michael Hack, The Implications of Apple’s Battle with the FBI, NETWORK SECURITY 
July 2016 at 8, 8–10.
64 See id.
65 San Bernardino Shooting Updates, L.A. TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-san-bernardino-shooting-live-updates-htmlstory.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2018).
66 Id.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss2/9
2018] THE FIGHT OVER ENCRYPTION 453
the attack.67 An investigation into their communications over the Internet suggested 
that the couple was communicating with a religious extremism group.68
Following the shooting, which resulted in the death of Farook and Malik among 
others, the United States government attempted to gain access to the content of 
Farook’s iPhone with little success.69 The iPhone was locked with a numeric password 
set by Farook.70 However, the FBI was unable to attempt to determine the passcode 
because Apple codes an auto-erase setting into all iPhones.71 This setting, if enabled 
by the user, erases all data after ten incorrect attempts to unlock the phone with a 
passcode.72 There is no way to tell whether or not the auto-erase function is enabled 
on a device.73
The FBI cited the All Writs Act74 in its argument and requested a court order to 
compel Apple to help the FBI gain access to the content contained on the iPhone by 
altering Apple’s software as a means of disabling the auto-erase function.75 The broad 
text of the All Writs Act, which Congress passed in 1789,76 “permits a court, in its 
‘sound judgment,’ to issue orders necessary ‘to achieve the rational ends of law’ and 
‘the ends of justice entrusted to it.’”77
In its argument, the FBI relied on United States v. New York Telephone Co., a case 
in which the Supreme Court upheld a district court’s order pursuant to the All Writs 
Act.78 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in that seminal case in 1977, “the All Writs 
                                                          
67 Richard Serrano, Senator: How Could Malik Get a K-1 Visa?, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015, 
9:28 AM) (citing a conversation between Senator Charles Schumer (D–N.Y.) and FBI Director 
James Comey), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-san-bernardino-shooting-live-
updates-htmlstory.html.
68 See Everything We Know About the San Bernardino Terror Attack Investigation So Far,
L.A. TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-san-bernardino-shooting-terror-
investigation-htmlstory.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2018). Farook and Malik “jointly pledged 
allegiance to Islamic State on social media” not long before the shooting occurred. Id. In 
Facebook messages to a couple of her friends from Pakistan dating back to 2012 and 2014, 
Malik “pledg[ed] her support for Islamic jihad and sa[id] she hoped to join the fight one day . . 
. .” Id.
69 Memorandum of Points & Authorities, supra note 15, at 2–3.
70 Id. at 3.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2017). The All Writs Act states, “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts 
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” Id.
75 Memorandum of Points & Authorities, supra note 15, at 9.
76 Robert Longtin, Apple, the FBI, and an Act from 1789: The FBI’s Impermissible Use of 
the All Writs Act, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (Mar. 28, 2016), https://cblr.columbia.edu/apple-the-
fbi-and-an-act-from-1789-the-fbis-impermissible-use-of-the-all-writs-act/.
77 Memorandum of Points & Authorities, supra note 15, at 9 (quoting United States v. N.Y. 
Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172–73) (1977)).
78 Id. at 10 (citing N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174).
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Act has been understood to authorize a federal court, in conjunction with a validly 
obtained search warrant, to issue writs to non-parties directing the recipient to provide 
‘reasonable technical assistance’ to the government in the execution of the warrant.”79
In N.Y. Telephone Co., the FBI sought an order from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York to compel a telephone company to provide 
technical assistance to the FBI for the use of pen registers in an investigation into 
alleged gambling offenses.80 The FBI submitted an affidavit alleging that “certain 
individuals were conducting an illegal gambling enterprise” and that “there was 
probable cause to conclude that an illegal gambling enterprise using the facilities of 
interstate commerce was being conducted.”81 Further, the affidavit claimed that two 
telephones were being used in relation to the described offenses.82 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court found that “the order compelling respondent to provide assistance was 
clearly authorized by the All Writs Act and comported with the intent of Congress.”83
For Apple to comply with a court order compelling the company to assist the FBI 
in unlocking Farook’s iPhone, Apple would have to create programming to undermine 
the iPhone’s security features, essentially creating a backdoor.84 Once created, this 
programming could be used on any iPhone to get past security features and hack into 
any device.85 While the government asserts that it would only use the programming in 
this specific instance, “[l]aw enforcement agents around the country . . . have hundreds 
of iPhones they want Apple to unlock if the FBI wins this case.”86 Beyond the fear that 
the government and law enforcement agencies around the country would use this 
“key” to gain access to other devices, a risk of “hackers and cybercriminals” getting 
their hands on this programming also exists, which would put electronic information 
at high risk.87
                                                          
79 Robert Chesney & Steve Vladeck, A Coherent Middle Ground in the Apple-FBI All Writs 
Act Dispute?, LAWFARE BLOG (Mar. 21, 2016, 7:00 AM) (citing N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 159),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/coherent-middle-ground-apple-fbi-all-writs-act-dispute.
80 N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 161. The United States Code defines pen register as 
a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic 
communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not 
include the contents of any communication, but such term does not include any device 
or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service 
for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided 
by such provider or any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire 
communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course 
of its business . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2009).
81 N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 162.
82 Id. at 161.
83 Id. at 160 (quoting the syllabus).
84 See Answers to Your Questions About Apple and Security, supra note 24.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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Apple fought the court order, describing the backdoor as “something we consider 
too dangerous to create.”88 Apple explained:
In today’s digital world, the “key” to an encrypted system is a piece of 
information that unlocks the data, and it is only as secure as the protections 
around it. Once the information is known, or a way to bypass the code is 
revealed, the encryption can be defeated by anyone with that knowledge.
The government suggests this tool could only be used once, on one phone. 
But that’s simply not true. Once created, the technique could be used over 
and over again, on any number of devices. In the physical world, it would 
be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions 
of locks—from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. No reasonable
person would find that acceptable.89
According to Apple, creating the backdoor would destroy years of Apple’s efforts 
in creating security features that secure customers’ personal data ranging from 
photographs to financial information.90 Not only would this backdoor make 
information vulnerable to criminals and hackers, it would also put personal, protected 
information into the hands of the government, thereby threatening the rise of “Big 
Brother.”
On February 16, 2016, the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California issued an order compelling Apple to provide assistance to the FBI in 
accessing the protected data on Farook’s iPhone.91 This order compelled Apple to 
assist the FBI in accessing content on the iPhone by way of modifying or creating 
programming to circumvent the security features on the iPhone to allow the 
government multiple attempts to determine the passcode.92 Despite the court order, 
Apple refused to assist the FBI in gaining access to the contents of the iPhone.93
On March 28, 2016, the FBI gained access to the iPhone with the help of a third 
party and dropped its case against Apple.94 The conclusion of the legal battle between 
the FBI and Apple was both a win and a loss for the technology company.95 The FBI 
dropping its case against Apple meant that Apple no longer had to comply with the 
court order.96 However, the FBI was able to gain access to the content on the iPhone 
without the assistance of Apple, revealing a weakness in Apple’s security features.97
                                                          
88 A Message to Our Customers, supra note 4.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Order Compelling Apple to Assist, supra note 16, at 1.
92 Id.
93 Benner & Goldstein, supra note 23.
94 David Pierson, FBI vs. Apple: How Both Sides Were Winners and Losers, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-apple-fbi-explainer-
20160329-snap-htmlstory.html.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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The government did not reveal how it was able to gain access to the iPhone and likely 
never will.98 However, speculation exists that the FBI hired Cellebrite, an Israeli 
company specializing in digital forensics, to unlock the iPhone.99
2. Jun Feng’s iPhone
The battle between the FBI and Apple did not end with the case regarding Farook’s 
iPhone. While the FBI dismissed its case against Apple over Farook’s iPhone, the FBI 
still fought against Apple to gain access to another iPhone.100 That iPhone belonged to 
Jun Feng, a New York resident who was indicted on charges in connection to a drug 
conspiracy on July 9, 2014.101 Similar to Farook’s iPhone, ten incorrect passcode 
attempts to unlock Feng’s iPhone would automatically erase all data stored on the 
device if the auto-erase function was enabled.102 The government issued a search 
warrant to search the contents on Feng’s iPhone.103 After Apple failed to comply with 
the search warrant, the FBI, citing the All Writs Act, asked the court to order Apple to 
help unlock the device.104
In contrast to the Farook case, a federal magistrate judge for the District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York declined to issue the order without first hearing from 
Apple.105 In his brief, Judge Orenstein distinguished Apple from N.Y. Telephone Co.106
In N.Y. Telephone Co., the Supreme Court held that authority granted pursuant to the 
All Writs Act allowed the Court to issue an order compelling N.Y. Telephone Co. to 
                                                          
98 Id.
99 Steve Morgan, John McAfee: ‘Professional Hackers Did Not Unlock the Shooter’s 
iPhone, Cellebrite Helped the FBI’, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/04/17/john-mcafee-professionals-hackers-did-
not-unlock-the-shooters-iphone-cellebrite-helped-the-fbi/#111ac58266a0; Jose Pagliery, 
Cellebrite Is the FBI’s Go-to Phone Hacker, CNN (Apr. 1, 2016), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/31/technology/cellebrite-fbi-phone/; Source: Israeli Firm 
Helped FBI Hack San Bernardino Terrorist’s iPhone (NBC television broadcast Mar. 29, 
2016). 
100 Devlin Barrett, Federal Prosecutors Drop Court Case to Force Apple to Unlock iPhone,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Barrett, Federal Prosecutors], 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-prosecutors-drop-court-case-to-force-apple-to-unlock-
iphone-1461377642.
101 McCoy, supra note 19.
102 Kevin Collier & William Turton, Here’s Why Apple Will No Longer Unlock Phones for 
Police, DAILY DOT (Jan. 23, 2016), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/apple-unlock-iphone-
court/.
103 Jose Pagliery, Feds Demand Apple’s Help in Unlocking Brooklyn Drug Dealer’s iPhone,
CNN (Apr. 8, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/08/technology/fbi-iphone-brooklyn/.
104 Id.; McCoy, supra note 19.
105 Frankel, supra note 21.
106 Memorandum & Order at 5, In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution 
of a Search Warrant Issued by This Court, No. 1:15–MC–1902–JO (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2015), 
2015 WL 5920207 at *5.
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assist the government with pen registers.107 Judge Orenstein cited four main 
differences between that case and Feng’s case:
(1) N.Y. Telephone Co. owned the pen registers and had access to the 
relevant information at its place of business. Apple did not own the 
device at issue.108
(2) N.Y. Telephone Co. provided public services and had a “substantial 
interest” in aiding law enforcement.109 The company also had a habit of 
using pen registers “for its own business purposes.”110 Apple was a 
private entity, had an interest in protecting its customers’ privacy, 
and did not in its regular course of business access customers’ secure 
data by bypassing security measures.111
(3) In N.Y. Telephone Co., law enforcement only had one option by which 
to obtain the necessary information, which was to have the telephone 
company install the pen registers and provide law enforcement with the 
information.112 Here, the government had not exhausted all other 
options. The government could have used “coercive contempt 
sanctions” to procure the phone password from the property owner.113
(4) In N.Y. Telephone Co., legislation was consistent with the court’s order 
requiring that the telephone company assist law enforcement in its 
surveillance.114 Here, among pleas by the government to enact 
legislation, Congress had not legislated on this issue.115 Further, 
members of Congress had introduced bills to limit the government’s 
power in similar circumstances, showing that Congress is aware of the 
issue and could legislate if it wanted.116
Because the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
disagreed with the government that N.Y. Telephone Co. was applicable to the case at 
hand, the court requested that Apple weigh in on the matter to decide whether the All 
Writs Act “permits the relief that the government seeks.”117 Both Apple and the 
                                                          
107 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 160 (1977).
108 Memorandum & Order, supra note 106, at 7.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 8.
117 Id. at 10.
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government filed briefs that argued their points of view.118 In a brief filed on October 
19, 2015, Apple addressed the issues of “feasibility” and “burden.”119 Apple explained 
that with each update of its operating system, compliance with an order compelling 
Apple to bypass security features installed on an iPhone would be increasingly 
burdensome.120 Apple designed its security features to protect against all invasions, 
including those from Apple itself.121 Further, Apple stated that it was concerned about 
the public reaction that would accompany Apple’s compliance with an order 
compelling Apple to bypass security features on iPhones.122
In its second brief filed on October 23, 2015, Apple argued that the All Writs Act 
should not provide relief to the government under these circumstances and cited the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”).123 CALEA 
requires telecommunications carriers to assist law enforcement by “redesign[ing] their 
network architectures to make . . . surveillance easier.”124 CALEA does not apply to 
stored information.125 Apple noted that Congress could have amended CALEA to 
apply to stored information on cell phones, but it had not yet done so.126 Thus, the 
                                                          
118 See Frankel, supra note 21.
119 Apple Inc.’s Response to Court’s Oct. 9, 2015 Memorandum & Order at 1–4, In re Order 
Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by This Court, No. 
1:15–MC–1902–JO (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2015).
120 Id. at 1.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 4. In its argument regarding potential public reaction to a court order compelling 
Apple to force its way into Feng’s iPhone, Apple stated the following:
[P]ublic sensitivity to issues regarding digital privacy and security is at an 
unprecedented level. This is true not only with respect to illegal hacking by criminals 
but also in the area of government access—both disclosed and covert. Apple has taken 
a leadership role in the protection of its customers’ personal data against any form of 
improper access. Forcing Apple to extract data in this case, absent clear legal authority 
to do so, could threaten the trust between Apple and its customers and substantially 
tarnish the Apple brand.
Id.
123 Apple Inc.’s Supplemental Response to Court’s Oct. 9, 2015 Order & Op. at 2, In re
Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by This 
Court, No. 1:15–MC–1902–JO (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Apple’s Supplemental 
Response]. In October 1994, Congress enacted CALEA “in response to concerns that emerging 
technologies such as digital and wireless communications were making it increasingly difficult 
for law enforcement agencies to execute authorized surveillance.” Communications Assistance 
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), FED. PRIVACY COUNCIL,
https://www.fpc.gov/communications-assistance-for-law-enforcement-calea/; see 47 U.S.C. §§ 
1001–10 (2014); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.20000–08 (2006); Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/public-safety-and-homeland-security/policy-and-
licensing-division/general/communications-assistance (last updated Oct. 5, 2017).
124 FAQ on the CALEA Expansion by the FCC, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/pages/calea-faq#15 (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
125 Id.; Apple’s Supplemental Response, supra note 123, at 5.
126 Apple’s Supplemental Response, supra note 123, at 5.
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government should not be able to use the All Writs Act to give itself power that 
Congress had failed to grant.127
After the court received argumentative briefs from both parties, but before Judge 
Orenstein ruled on the matter, Jun Feng pleaded guilty to the charges on October 29, 
2015.128 The FBI argued that it still needed access to the phone to assist in its 
continuing investigation of the conspiracy.129 Apple sent a letter to Judge Orenstein 
urging him to decide the question of whether the government could use the All Writs 
Act to compel Apple to write software that would bypass security features on the
device.130
In his final ruling issued on February 29, 2016, Judge Orenstein considered various 
factors such as “the relative closeness of Apple’s relationship to the underlying 
criminal case and government investigation, the burden the requested order would
place on the company and the ‘necessity of imposing such a burden on Apple.’”131 He 
reached the conclusion that “[n]one of those factors justifie[d] imposing on Apple the 
obligation to assist the government’s investigation against the company’s will . . . .”132
The DOJ appealed the Judge’s final ruling; however, the DOJ dropped its case against 
Apple on April 22, 2016 when Jun Feng provided the DOJ with his passcode after he 
“learned his phone had become an issue in a high-stakes legal fight between 
prosecutors and Apple.”133
On March 1, 2016, in the midst of the case regarding Feng’s iPhone, the 
government and Apple testified before the House Judiciary Committee and urged 
Congress to settle the matter of whether the government can compel technology 
companies to act under similar circumstances.134 Employees of the DOJ and Apple 
were not the only individuals trying to get legislation passed on the issue. Senators 
Dianne Feinstein and Richard Burr drafted a bill that would impose fines on any 
company, such as Apple, that fails to comply with a court order to assist law 
                                                          
127 See id. at 6.
128 Frankel, supra note 21; Cyrus Farivar, After Guilty Plea, Judge Confused as to Why 
Prosecutors Still Want iPhone Unlocked, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 30, 2015), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/feds-apple-must-still-unlock-iphone-5s-even-
after-defendant-pled-guilty/.
129 Spencer Ackerman et al., Apple Case: Judge Rejects FBI Request for Access to Drug
Dealer’s iPhone, GUARDIAN (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/29/apple-fbi-case-drug-dealer-iphone-jun-
feng-san-bernardino.
130 Frankel, supra note 21.
131 McCoy, supra note 19; see Memorandum & Order at 1, In re Order Requiring Apple, 
Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by This Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 
344 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 1:15–MC–1902–JO).
132 McCoy, supra note 19.
133 Barrett, Federal Prosecutors, supra note 100; see Julia Love et al., U.S. to Continue 
Appeal of iPhone Data Case in New York, REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-idUSKCN0X51UQ.
134 Benner & Goldstein, supra note 23.
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enforcement in decrypting data on cellphones.135 However, the bill died before 
reaching the Senate.136 On the other side of the issue, Representative Mike McCaul
and Senator Mark Warner were attempting to put together a commission of experts to 
determine the potential effects of encryption legislation.137 Regardless of the efforts 
being made to legislate the matter, Congress has not yet settled the debate.138 Until 
then, the war over encryption will rage on.139
C. Other Legal Battles over Data Access
Apple was not the only technology company involved in legal controversies with 
law enforcement over access to data.140 In 2014, the government obtained a search 
warrant pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2703, that 
compelled Microsoft to release data stored on a Microsoft server located in Dublin, 
Ireland in relation to a drug trafficking case.141 The United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held Microsoft in contempt of court after Microsoft 
                                                          
135 Levi Sumagaysay, Apple vs. FBI: A Look at Proposed Laws on Phones and Encryption,
SILICONBEAT (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.siliconbeat.com/2016/03/10/apple-vs-fbi-look-
proposed-laws-phones-encryption/?doing_wp_cron=1486758699.1264860630035400390625; 
Dustin Volz & Mark Hosenball, Senators Close to Finishing Encryption Penalties Legislation: 
Sources, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-
legislation-idUSKCN0WB2QC.
136 Shara Tibken, Apple vs. FBI One Year Later: Still Stuck in Limbo, CNET (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-vs-fbi-one-year-later-still-stuck-in-limbo/.
137 Brian Barrett, The Apple-FBI Battle Is Over, but the New Crypto Wars Have Just Begun,
WIRED (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/apple-fbi-battle-crypto-wars-just-
begun/; Volz & Hosenball, supra note 135.
138 See Tibken, supra note 136.
139 Joseph Marks, The Encryption Wars Will Return One Way or Another, NEXTGOV (Jan. 
23, 2017), http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2017/01/encryption-wars-will-return-one-
way-or-another/134802/.
140 Tibken, supra note 136.
141 Joon Ian Wong, Microsoft’s Win over the US Government Is a Rare Moment of Clarity 
Around Global Data Laws, QUARTZ (July 18, 2016), https://qz.com/733538/microsofts-win-
over-the-us-government-is-a-rare-moment-of-clarity-around-global-data-laws/. 18 U.S.C. § 
2703 provides in relevant part the following:
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic 
communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in 
electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty 
days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State 
warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction. A governmental entity may 
require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communications services of the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an 
electronic communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days by the 
means available under subsection (b) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2009).
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failed to comply with the request.142 Microsoft appealed the district court’s decision to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.143 On appeal, Microsoft 
argued that “the DOJ . . . exceeded its authority with potentially dangerous 
consequences.”144 Amicus briefs filed by entities such as Apple, Fox News, NPR, the 
Guardian, and the government of Ireland argued, “the case could set a precedent for 
governments around the world to seize information held in the cloud.”145 However, 
the United States government argued that it had “the right to demand the emails of 
anyone in the world from any email provider headquartered within US borders . . . 
.”146 On July 14, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
decided the case in favor of Microsoft.147 The Court of Appeals concluded:
Congress did not intend the SCA’s warrant provisions to apply 
extraterritorially. The focus of those provisions is protection of a user’s 
privacy interests. Accordingly, the SCA does not authorize a U.S. court to 
issue and enforce an SCA warrant against a United States-based service 
provider for the contents of a customer’s electronic communications stored 
on servers located outside the United States.148
Regarding the court’s decision, Microsoft stated that:
The decision is important for three reasons: it ensures that people’s privacy 
rights are protected by the laws of their own countries; it helps ensure that 
the legal protections of the physical world apply in the digital domain; and 
it paves the way for better solutions to address both privacy and law 
enforcement needs.149
Following the Microsoft decision, a federal magistrate judge ordered Google to 
comply with a search warrant that requested emails stored outside of the country.150
                                                          
142 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 201–02 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted,
138 S. Ct. 356 (2017) (No. 17–2; set for argument on Feb. 27, 2018).
143 Id.
144 Sam Thielman, Microsoft Case: DoJ Says It Can Demand Every Email from Any US-
Based Provider, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/09/microsoft-court-case-hotmail-ireland-
search-warrant.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d at 201–02.
148 Id. at 222.
149 Brad Smith, Our Search Warrant Case: An Important Decision for People Everywhere,
MICROSOFT (July 14, 2016), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2016/07/14/search-
warrant-case-important-decision-people-everywhere/#sm.0001y50mmsftseaxyiq233trt2lq0.
150 Natasha Lomas, Google Told to Hand Over Foreign Emails in FBI Search Warrant 
Ruling, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 4, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/04/google-told-to-hand-
over-foreign-emails-in-fbi-search-warrant-ruling/.
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The government obtained the search warrants in August 2016.151 The search warrants 
requested that Google release electronic information to the government in connection 
with two criminal investigations.152 Google handed over data that was stored on its 
servers inside the country.153 As to the other emails requested, Google stated that it 
could not know where the emails were located.154 The district court, relying on 
Google’s stipulations, described Google’s data system as follows:
Google stores user data in various locations, some of which are in the 
United States and some of which are in countries outside the United States. 
Some user files may be broken into component parts, and different parts of 
a single file may be stored in different locations (and, accordingly, different 
countries) at the same time. Google operates a state-of-the-art intelligent 
network that, with respect to some types of data, including some of the data 
at issue in this case, automatically moves data from one location on 
Google’s network to another as frequently as needed to optimize for 
performance, reliability, and other efficiencies. As a result, the country or 
countries in which specific user data, or components of that data, is located 
may change. It is possible that the network will change the location of data 
between the time when the legal process is sought and when it is served. 
As such, Google contends that it does not currently have the capability, for 
all of its services, to determine the location of the data and produce that 
data to a human user at any particular point in time.155
Therefore, Google argued that it did not have to comply with the search warrants and 
cited Microsoft in support of its position.156 However, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the holding in Microsoft.157 The court 
held “that the disclosure by Google of the electronic data relevant to the warrants at 
issue here constitute[d] neither a ‘seizure’ nor a ‘search’ of the targets’ data in a foreign 
country.”158 The court stated that the “conduct relevant to the SCA’s focus will occur 
in the United States.”159 Therefore, these cases presented “a permissible domestic 
application of the SCA, even if other conduct (the electronic transfer of data) occurs 
abroad,” and the court ordered Google to comply with the search warrants.160
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The differences in the outcomes of Microsoft and the Google case further illustrate 
the importance of Congressional action on matters involving electronic data. Law 
enforcement has also requested that Amazon hand over Echo smart speaker recordings 
in relation to a murder in Arkansas.161 The amount of government requests for data 
information has increased in the past few years, shedding even more light on the 
growing tension between the government and technology companies.162
IV. CONGRESS MUST ENACT LEGISLATION ADDRESSING THE LIMITS OF THE 
GOVERNMENT’S POWER OVER TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES IN ORDER TO PROMOTE 
EFFICIENCY, PREDICTABILITY, AND UNIFORMITY IN THE LAW
Because neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has answered the question of 
how far the government and law enforcement agencies are able to go in compelling 
technology companies to assist in investigations, the cases regarding this issue are 
unpredictable. When an issue involving data encryption reaches the court, it is unclear 
whether the court will issue an order compelling a company to assist the government 
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in hacking a device.163 In the two recent cases involving the FBI and Apple, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York and the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California reached opposite conclusions on 
the issue.164 A magistrate judge for the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York denied the FBI’s request for a court order after asking Apple to 
weigh in on the matter.165 In stark contrast, a magistrate judge for the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California issued a court order without first 
allowing Apple to plead its case.166
What the United States District Court for the Central District of California 
considered in reaching its decision to issue the court order is unclear.167 Moreover, the 
law in districts where this issue has not yet surfaced also is unclear. A technology 
company might be compelled to hack into a device to assist law enforcement if the 
judge issuing the order sides with encryption legislation. However, if a judge’s 
personal view is that data encryption should remain intact, then that judge might deny 
a request to issue such a court order. A court may not have any rhyme or reason as to 
whether it will issue an order compelling a technology company to assist law 
enforcement or the government in hacking into locked devices. The outcome of cases 
that set the government at odds with technology companies might be based on which 
judge hears the case or in which district the court is located. This unpredictability is a 
problem because neither party knows what to expect. This issue is highly debated 
nationwide and has been gaining momentum; therefore, it warrants federal 
legislation.168
If the legislature does not step in and solve the problem, the issue may eventually 
reach the judiciary. This is the case for the issue in Microsoft, as the Supreme Court 
recently granted certiorari.169 Microsoft raises the issue of government access to 
consumer data that is stored overseas, which is just one gap in the legislation regarding 
government access to data and individual privacy rights. The outcome of this case may 
fill in that tiny gap in legislation, but will not speak to the issue of whether the 
government and law enforcement agencies can compel companies to modify or create 
programming to assist in access to encrypted data. When, or even if, appeals from 
other cases involving the government and technology companies will reach the 
Supreme Court is not clear.170 The lack of indication of when such an appeal would 
reach the Supreme Court results from the FBI dropping its cases against Apple as soon 
as it gains access to the devices in question.171 Even if an appeal did reach the Supreme 
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Court, the Court may or may not grant certiorari to hear the case.172 Meanwhile, 
precious resources such as time and money are being used in litigation and problem 
solving. Moreover, the government and technology companies will continue to 
exhaust resources in litigating these matters until either Congress legislates or the 
Supreme Court decides a case on the issue. District courts will continue to be bogged 
down with cases regarding access to locked devices, stealing time and attention away 
from other important matters.
Because Apple and other technology companies would have to expend resources 
to hack into locked devices, they should know what they are legally obligated to do. 
Federal legislation setting out a hard and fast rule defining what the government can 
and cannot force a technology company to do to gain access to content on locked 
devices would create predictability and uniformity in the law. Technology companies 
would be better prepared to take on their legal obligations if they knew what to expect 
ahead of time. If the Supreme Court decides that the government can force technology 
companies into writing or modifying programming, technology companies would 
need to prepare resources to comply.173 For example, creating a backdoor would take 
the work of “six to ten Apple engineers and employees dedicating a very substantial 
portion of their time.”174 This issue must be handled uniformly, predictably, and with 
efficiency, which is why it calls for Congress’s immediate attention.
A. Legislation that Prevents the Creation of a Backdoor Will Protect, Rather than 
Harm, National Security
The FBI attempted to compel Apple to create a backdoor into its iPhone so that the 
FBI could gain access to personal information contained on the device to protect 
national security.175 However, the government’s reasoning had a fatal flaw. The very 
act of creating the backdoor undermines national security because it creates a 
vulnerability in data security.176 The backdoor is analogous to a dangerous weapon. 
Apple explained that the creation of an operating system is unlike the creation of 
something tangible.177 Once created, the operating system cannot be destroyed.178 In 
regard to the creation of the backdoor, Apple stated, “[we] would do our best to protect 
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that key, but in a world where all of our data is under constant threat, it would be 
relentlessly attacked by hackers and cybercriminals.”179 Further, any individual or 
entity would be vulnerable to such an attack.180
In January 2017, Cellebrite, the company that allegedly provided the hack to the 
FBI to gain access to Farook’s iPhone, was itself a victim of a hack.181 The hackers 
sent “customer information, databases, and a vast amount of technical data regarding 
Cellebrite’s products” to Motherboard, a website for technology and science 
publications.182 Cellebrite is not the only hacking company that has been the victim of 
a cybercrime. In 2015, a hacker known as Phineas Fisher gained access to the servers
of Hacking Team, an Italian hacking company, and “took everything there was to take, 
laying bare all the company’s secrets, including its once closely-held list of 
customers.”183 The hack on Cellebrite appeared to be connected to the hack that 
Cellebrite provided to the FBI as a means of bypassing security features on Farook’s 
iPhone.184 In an online chat, the hacker made the following statement to Motherboard:
The debate around backdoors is not going to go away, rather, its [sic] is 
almost certainly going to get more intense as we lurch toward a more 
authoritarian society . . . . It’s important to demonstrate that when you 
create these tools, they will make it out. History should make that clear . . . 
.185
The hack on Cellebrite is a perfect example of the dangers lurking behind the 
creation of a backdoor. Even companies whose purpose of business is to provide 
hacking tools are not protected from being hacked themselves.186 Apple would 
struggle to protect the backdoor if created.187 Further, if Apple were compelled to 
create a backdoor and this became precedent, law enforcement agencies around the 
country would seek access to the backdoor. It would only be a matter of time before 
the backdoor found its way into the wrong hands.
Another shortcoming in the argument for legislation prohibiting technology 
companies from failing to comply with court orders to hack into devices is that it fails 
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to consider actions taken in response to the legislation. If the Supreme Court sets 
precedent or Congress enacts legislation compelling technology companies to assist 
the government in hacking devices, criminals will take steps to ensure that no evidence 
is available for law enforcement to discover.188 Criminals will erase data stored on 
devices, use burner phones,189 or dispose of their devices before committing an illegal 
act. Another problem Apple foresees is that “[c]riminals and bad actors will still 
encrypt, using tools that are readily available to them.”190 Therefore, this precedent or 
legislation would not help protect national security, but rather, “would hurt only the 
well-meaning and law-abiding citizens who rely on companies like Apple to protect 
their data.”191
Until Congress writes legislation creating a concrete rule, the legal battles between 
law enforcement agencies and technology companies will continue. The 
unpredictability of this issue leaves the population uncomfortable, with a sense that 
personal information is no longer protected.192 These legal battles have already had 
ramifications. Technology companies such as Apple, Facebook, and WhatsApp have 
been upgrading their security features to make it nearly impossible for data to be 
hacked.193
However, the proposed law will not change the fact that agencies still must comply 
with valid search warrants. Upon a showing of probable cause, law enforcement 
agencies will still be able to obtain search warrants authorized by a court to allow them 
to order technology companies to release all information in their control, possession, 
or both.194 In this respect, law enforcement still has the means to protect national 
security. The government and law enforcement agencies will continue to have access 
to important information, by way of a search warrant or court order, to further criminal 
investigations and prove an individual’s criminal activity in a court of law.195 For 
example, Apple provided the FBI with all data that Farook had backed up to his iCloud 
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account from his iPhone.196 Apple obtained this information from its iCloud servers.197
The data provided important information to the FBI; it “showed that Farook was in 
communication with individuals who were later killed.”198 While the proposed law 
would block the government from forcing companies to create backdoors into their 
devices, the government still would retain the means to obtain crucial information 
from companies. Further, the law would protect national security by continuing to 
protect encrypted data.
B. Law that Allows the Government to Force Technology Companies to Write 
Programming Violates Constitutional Rights
If the government succeeds in forcing Apple or any technology company to create 
backdoor programming, this type of order would violate companies’ and customers’ 
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.199 In 
its fight against the government, Apple argued that forcing the company to write 
programming would violate its First Amendment right to freedom of speech.200 The 
right to freedom of speech includes the right not to be forced to say something.201
Apple argued that well-settled law had “established code as free speech within the 
context of the First Amendment.”202 The court order, which would force Apple to 
“cryptographically ‘sign’ any software it creates,” would essentially “amount[] to 
compelled speech and viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First 
Amendment.”203
Apple further argued that a court order compelling it to create programming would 
violate its Fifth Amendment right to due process of law.204 Forcing the company to 
create programming would be “highly burdensome, and contrary to the party’s core 
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principles . . . .”205 Further, forcing Apple to write programming for the government 
would violate “Apple’s substantive due process right to be free from the ‘arbitrary 
deprivation of [its] liberties.’”206
Additionally, a court order would violate Apple’s consumers’ Fourth Amendment 
right to privacy.207 If the government could force Apple to create a backdoor, 
weakening its security features, it would “compromise the privacy of people who 
aren’t even involved in the case . . . .”208 Individuals have a right to encrypt their data 
and to be provided protections from companies that will keep that data protected from 
hackers and cybercriminals.209 The proposed law would protect the privacy rights of 
innocent individuals. Further, citizens would have peace of mind that their personal 
information is protected against an increased risk of hacks. Compelling a technology 
company to create a “key” or backdoor to its security features undermines the effort 
that the company has put into securing the personal information of its customer base. 
Thus, the proposed law would protect individuals against violations of their First, 
Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights.
C. Legislation Restricting the Government’s Power Would Keep Big Brother at Bay
The backdoor is not only dangerous if placed in the hands of criminals or hackers, 
but also because the government could exploit it. In the Farook case, the FBI argued 
that the backdoor would be used only in that particular instance; however, Apple 
argued that “there [was] no way to guarantee such control.”210 In other words, Apple 
would have no way to ensure that the government would not abuse the “key” by 
exploiting the tool for matters unrelated to the Farook case.211 Apple stated:
If the government can use the All Writs Act to make it easier to unlock your 
iPhone, it would have the power to reach into anyone’s device to capture 
their data. The government could extend this breach of privacy and demand 
that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your messages, access 
your health records or financial data, track your location, or even access 
your phone’s microphone or camera without your knowledge.212
While the question remained whether Farook’s actions were tied to terrorist 
activity213 directly affecting our national security, not all criminal cases involving 
locked devices are threatening to the security of our nation. A judgment in favor of 
the FBI could create a slippery slope. Law enforcement around the country would use 
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this precedent to compel Apple and other technology companies to hack into locked 
devices in connection to any criminal case law enforcement is investigating, not just 
those cases that put our national security in jeopardy. In regard to a homicide 
investigation, the district attorney of Baton Rouge stated that “[i]t just doesn’t seem 
fair” in response to Apple’s answer that it could not obtain all data from a locked 
device.214 The district attorney of San Bernardino County also thought that Apple 
should be compelled to assist the government to gain access to iPhones “for certain 
kinds of investigations,” such as homicide and missing persons investigations.215
A similar problem would exist if Congress enacts legislation compelling 
companies to comply with court orders to assist law enforcement by hacking into 
phones. Law enforcement would cite that act to compel technology companies to hack 
into all locked devices. Even if Congress did set parameters for the rule, law 
enforcement would try to stretch the rule to apply to all situations regardless of the 
gravity of the issue. For example, consider a situation where Congress passed a bill 
into law that states technology companies must comply with court orders to hack into 
devices when national security is at risk. Law enforcement agencies will make the 
argument that national security is at risk in every case that involves a locked device. 
Congress would have difficulty explaining under what circumstances our national 
security is at risk versus circumstances that would not suggest that our national 
security is at risk. It would be hard to say whether the security of our nation is at risk 
if we do not have access to certain information. Therefore, law enforcement would 
argue that the security of our nation could be in jeopardy in most cases. Where would 
Congress draw the line? To ensure protection against governmental abuse of power, 
Congress should prohibit the government from compelling technology companies to 
write programming to hack into locked devices with no exceptions.
D. The Costs Associated with Creating a Backdoor Outweigh the Benefits
If the FBI won its case against Apple, Apple would need to spend over one hundred 
thousand dollars in labor costs alone to rewrite its security programming.216 Apple also 
estimated that it would take anywhere from two to four weeks to create the 
backdoor.217 One could argue that the cost to Apple in creating the backdoor is less 
than the cost to the government in hacking an iPhone without the help of Apple. For 
example, according to one source, the government paid over one million dollars to a 
third party to hack Farook’s iPhone.218 Further, the government pledged to Apple that 
it would pay for the monetary costs associated with reworking the software.219
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However, this argument fails to look at other costs associated with creating the 
backdoor. 
Once Apple creates the backdoor, Apple would “‘likely’ build ‘one or two secure 
facilities’ similar to a ‘Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility’” to protect the 
hack from being leaked.220 Apple also stated that it would “spend ‘additional time’ 
destroying every line of code in [the hack]—and closely guarding any logs that led to 
its creation.”221 Apple would repeat this effort in every future case in which Apple is
ordered to hack into an iPhone.222 Former FBI Director James Comey stated that a 
judgment in the FBI’s favor could serve as precedent in the future to compel 
companies to assist the government in hacking into phones.223 According to a survey, 
law enforcement cannot gain access to potential evidence on over one thousand locked 
devices.224 In Manhattan alone, the district attorney would use this precedent to have 
Apple unlock devices in connection with almost two hundred criminal cases.225
The government would argue that expending these resources is necessary to 
protect national security. However, one cannot say with certainty that unlocking a 
device in question will lead to evidence. While unlocking a device may uncover 
evidence, the possibility exists that the phone contains nothing worth discovering. 
After spending $1.3 million to hack Farook’s iPhone, the FBI did not gain much more 
insight into the case.226 The phone lacked “evidence of contacts with other ISIS 
supporters or the use of encrypted communications during the period the FBI was 
concerned about.”227 Further, the FBI still has questions regarding the incident that 
“remain[] unsolved.”228
Also, if Apple were to create a backdoor, the company’s reputation likely would 
suffer significant damage.229 Apple consumers would no longer trust the company’s 
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promise of protection, and the company would lose consumers as a result.230 Foreign 
corporations, as well as United States consumers, would no longer buy a device from 
a technology company such as Apple that has a backdoor.231 Instead, consumers would 
buy from technology companies outside of the United States.232
V. PROPOSED LAW PROHIBITING THE GOVERNMENT FROM FORCING TECHNOLOGY 
COMPANIES TO GAIN ACCESS TO ENCRYPTED DATA BY CREATING BACKDOORS INTO 
THEIR DEVICES
Congress should enact legislation limiting the government’s power over 
technology companies. The proposed legislation would prevent the government and 
law enforcement agencies from using the All Writs Act as a catchall, giving them the 
power to force companies to do that which Congress has not given them the power to 
do. This law would prohibit the government and law enforcement agencies from 
compelling technology companies to modify or create software, which would weaken 
their security features allowing law enforcement to gain access into an individual’s 
locked device. The government would not have authority to force companies to create 
backdoors into their devices that would undermine the company’s security efforts. 
However, this law should not deprive technology companies of the right to aid the 
government or law enforcement in investigations in which threats to national security 
or public safety exist. This law would only allow the government and law enforcement 
agencies to provide reasonable compensation to companies in exchange for their 
services, thus banning companies from selling backdoors or hacks into data security 
systems.
The proposed legislation would contain four main components. The first 
component is a requirement that all companies that provide data services must provide 
data security to their customers. This would also require technology companies to 
comply with legal court orders. The second component would prohibit the government 
and law enforcement agencies from forcing data service providers to provide 
technological assistance by way of creating or modifying programming. The third 
component would give permission to data service providers to provide such 
technological assistance to law enforcement or the government to aid in law 
investigations in which a present danger to national security or public safety exists. 
The fourth and final component would be a requirement that the government and law 
enforcement agencies provide reasonable compensation in exchange for any 
technological assistance that is given to them, but no more than what is reasonable for 
the services.
A. Legislation Should Include a Statement that Data Service Providers Shall Provide 
Security, but also Comply with Legal Court Orders
The proposed legislation would acknowledge that data service providers should 
first and foremost provide security to their customers, but that they must also comply 
with all legal court orders. To be in compliance with a court order requesting 
information, a data service provider shall provide requested information that the 
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company has within its control or possession. The request may encompass user 
account information, which can include the name and address of the individual 
associated with the account, and documents, contacts, calendars, and other 
information stored on the account if the company can access the account through its 
servers.233
For example, this section could state:
[A]ll providers of communications services and products (including 
software) should protect the privacy of United States persons through 
implementation of appropriate data security and still respect the rule of law 
and comply with all legal requirements and court orders; . . . to uphold both 
the rule of law and protect the interests and security of the United States, 
all persons receiving an authorized judicial order for information or data 
must provide, in a timely manner, responsive . . . information or data [that 
the provider has in its control or possession] . . . .234
B. Legislation Should Prohibit the Government and Law Enforcement Agencies from 
Forcing Technology Companies to Provide Technological Assistance in the Form of 
Created or Modified Programming
The most important component of the proposed legislation is the prohibition of the 
government and law enforcement agencies from compelling a data service provider to 
create a backdoor to its devices. This section would prohibit the government and law 
enforcement agencies from forcing companies to modify or create programming to 
bypass security features on their devices. This restriction would contain no exceptions. 
Under no circumstances should the government or law enforcement agencies be 
permitted to force companies to provide this specific technological assistance. If an 
exception were written into the proposed legislation, the government would attempt 
to shoehorn all circumstances into the exception; thus, to allow one exception would 
be a slippery slope. The following is an example of language for this section of the 
proposed legislation: 
The government and law enforcement agencies, in seeking a court order to 
compel a data service provider to render information valuable to an ongoing 
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investigation, shall not compel a data service provider to modify or create 
programming in order to provide comprehensible information.
This language is merely one example, as there are many other ways in which the text 
of the proposed legislation could prohibit the government and law enforcement from 
forcing companies to breach their own security.
C. Legislation Should Give Technology Companies the Option to Provide 
Technological Assistance to the Government or Law Enforcement
While the basis for the proposed legislation is that the government and law 
enforcement cannot, under any circumstances, compel technology companies to create 
or modify programming, the legislation would not prohibit technology companies 
from providing assistance to the government or law enforcement per se. The proposed 
legislation would give data service providers the option to provide technological 
assistance to aid the government or law enforcement in investigations in which 
national security and public safety are threatened. In investigations in which the 
immediate threat has been neutralized and investigators have little reason to suspect 
an ongoing threat to public safety or national security, the proposed legislation would 
prohibit technology companies from assisting the government or law enforcement by 
creating a backdoor to their systems. This limited permissiveness would provide a 
balance between national security and the privacy rights of citizens. This section could 
read as follows: 
This Act shall not preclude providers of communications services and 
products from providing technical assistance, by way of creating or 
modifying programming, to aid law enforcement or government
investigations in which there is an ongoing, perceived threat to national 
security or public safety.
D. Requirement of the Government to Provide Reasonable Compensation to a 
Company in Exchange for Technological Assistance and Prohibition of Technology 
Companies from Selling Hacks or Backdoors
The fourth and final component of the proposed legislation is a requirement that 
the government or law enforcement agencies provide reasonable compensation to any 
technology company that provides technological assistance to aid in an investigation. 
This piece of the proposed legislation would also ban companies from selling their 
hacking services to the government or law enforcement agencies. If a technology 
company decides to provide technological assistance to the government or law 
enforcement to assist them in an investigation, the technology company would only 
be able to receive reasonable compensation in exchange for their services. This 
restriction would deter companies from creating hacks or backdoors to security 
systems for pecuniary gain. In deciding whether to provide technological assistance to 
aid an investigation in which national security or public safety is threatened, a 
company would be less likely to use personal gain as a motivating factor. Rather, the
company would be left to weigh only competing interests such as citizens’ 
Constitutional rights, national security, and public safety. As an example, this section 
of the proposed legislation could state the following: 
In the event that a provider of communications services or products 
provides technical assistance in response to a request from a government or 
law enforcement agency, the entity requesting such information shall 
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compensate the provider “for such costs as are reasonably necessary and 
which have been directly incurred in providing such technical assistance or 
such data in an intelligible format.”235
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent legal battles between the government and technology companies reveal a 
problem with the gap in legislation regarding what the government and law 
enforcement agencies can and cannot force technology companies to do as a means of 
gaining access to encrypted data on locked devices. While the government is 
attempting to broaden its access to information, the concern over privacy rights and 
national security increases. Citizens are increasingly aware of the vast information to 
which the government already has access.236 Recently, the government has sought 
court orders from districts courts to compel technology companies to write or rewrite 
programming to bypass security features on locked devices.237 The district courts are 
split on this issue.238 The FBI has taken Apple to court in two recent cases to gain 
access to locked iPhones. In one case, a magistrate judge for the district court granted 
the order.239 In the other case, a magistrate judge declined to issue the order.240 The 
issue is unpredictable; Apple and the government have no guess as to how courts will 
decide similar cases.241
To resolve this issue, Congress should pass federal legislation to block the 
government and law enforcement agencies from obtaining access to court orders 
compelling technology companies to change their security programming as a means 
of gaining access to locked devices. A court order compelling a technology company
to write programming would violate the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights of 
companies and consumers.242 Because individuals nationwide store personal 
information on encrypted devices, this backdoor is dangerous. Not only could the 
government and law enforcement agencies use the backdoor as precedent to act as 
“Big Brother,” but it creates a risk that hackers and cybercriminals could obtain the 
hack.243 Encryption of data is important to the safety of our personal data. Companies 
spend time and money to design operating systems that ensure the protection of data.244
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Compelling companies to rewrite their programming undermines efforts made to 
secure data.245 Therefore, our national security is put in jeopardy by the very act taken 
by the government to protect the security of our nation. Therefore, Congress must 
enact legislation that will prevent the government from undermining the very thing 
that the government is trying to protect: national security.
This law would not bar technology companies from providing technological 
assistance by creating or modifying security programming to aid law enforcement or 
the government in investigations in which public safety or national security are 
threatened. However, if a company decides to provide this type of assistance, the 
company cannot put a price on the backdoor or hack. Under the legislation proposed 
in this Note, the government or law enforcement agency would only be authorized by 
law to provide reasonable compensation to companies in exchange for services 
rendered. This restriction would prevent companies from selling hacks or backdoors 
for pecuniary gain. The proposed legislation is necessary to protect and balance the 
interests of national security and the Constitutional rights of companies and citizens.
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